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CASE NOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—A Tale of Two Conﬂicting Mandates: Limiting
Agency Authority under the Endangered Species Act or Resolution of the
Statutory Overlap?, National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
Alicia D. Kisling*

INTRODUCTION
In February 2002, ofﬁcials from the State of Arizona applied for Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) authorization to administer and oversee the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) within the state’s borders,
pursuant to section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA).1 Section 402(b) of the
CWA authorizes any state to request a transfer of NPDES permitting authority to
state ofﬁcials.2 This section directs the EPA, the agency originally responsible for
administering the NPDES program within each state, to approve a state’s transfer
application as long as that state meets the nine criteria laid out in the statute.3 The
State of Arizona satisﬁed all nine statutory criteria.4
After reviewing the state’s application, however, the EPA determined a
transfer of NPDES permitting authority could potentially affect endangered and
threatened species in Arizona.5 Consequently, the EPA initiated consultation with
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).6 The FWS concluded a transfer of permitting
authority would not directly impact listed species, however, the FWS expressed

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I would like to thank my husband Jeremy
for his continued love and support.
1

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (2007); Clean
Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). Under Arizona’s petition, the Arizona Department
of Environmental Quality would be responsible for administering and overseeing the State’s NPDES
pollution permitting system. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2005). At
the time of Arizona’s transfer application, the EPA had already granted forty-four other states and
several United States territories authority to administer the NPDES permitting system within their
borders. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2527 n.3.
2

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

3

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); see infra note 39 and accompanying text (stating the nine criteria a state
must satisfy prior to obtaining NPDES pollution permitting authority).
4

Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 963 n.11.

5

Id. at 952.

6

Id. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires each federal agency to consult the Secretary charged
with administering the ESA to insure any agency action will not jeopardize endangered and
threatened species. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The FWS is
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concern that the transfer would lead to an issuance of more permits, which could
indirectly jeopardize listed species.7
The EPA disagreed, stating a transfer of permitting authority to Arizona would
not negatively impact endangered species in the future.8 Furthermore, the EPA
maintained section 402(b) of the CWA required the EPA to approve Arizona’s
transfer application once the state met the section’s nine statutory criteria.9 In
support of the EPA’s position, the FWS issued a biological opinion indicating the
transfer of permitting authority would not jeopardize listed species.10 As a result
of the biological opinion, the EPA determined Arizona satisﬁed the nine statutory
requirements set forth in section 402(b) of the CWA, and subsequently approved
the state’s transfer application.11
Respondents Defenders of Wildlife, the Center for Biological Diversity, and
Craig Miller, an Arizona Resident (collectively, “Defenders”) ﬁled a petition for
review of the EPA’s transfer decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.12 Defenders also brought a lawsuit against the EPA in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona alleging the FWS’s biological
opinion did not comply with ESA standards.13 The Ninth Circuit allowed three
responsible for administering the ESA with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Interior; the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) administers the ESA with respect to
species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 222.101(a),
223.102, 402.01(b) (2007).
7

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (2007)
(noting the FWS’ fear that because section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies only to federal agency actions,
transferring permitting authority to Arizona could allow Arizona ofﬁcials to issue NPDES permits
without considering the potential effect on listed species).
8

Id.

9

Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (stating the EPA “shall approve each submitted program unless
[it] determines that adequate authority does not exist” to meet the nine statutory requirements).
10

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2527. Pursuant to ESA section 7(c)(1), “each
Federal agency shall . . . request of the [Secretary of the Interior] information whether any species
which is listed or proposed to be listed may be present in the area” of the agency’s proposed action,
prior to undertaking the proposed action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000). If the Secretary of the
Interior determines a listed species may exist, the FWS shall conduct a biological assessment to
determine whether any endangered or threatened species are likely to be affected by the agency
action. Id.
11

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2527-28.

12

Id. at 2528; 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) (2000) (stating the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to hear a petition regarding the EPA’s transfer decision under section 402(b) of the CWA). Defenders
prevailed on their petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and became
respondents before the Supreme Court when the State of Arizona appealed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to the United States Supreme Court. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2528.
13
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court held
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over Defenders’ biological opinion
challenge pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) and ordered the challenge transferred to the
Ninth Circuit and consolidated with the EPA transfer suit. Id.
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other parties to intervene as petitioners in the case: the National Association of
Home Builders, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce, and the State of Arizona
(collectively, “Home Builders”).14 Defenders’ two lawsuits were consolidated and
brought before the Ninth Circuit where a divided panel granted Defenders’ petition
and vacated the EPA’s transfer decision, holding the decision was arbitrary and
capricious.15 The Ninth Circuit found the EPA’s decision arbitrary and capricious
because the EPA relied on legally contradictory positions regarding its obligations
under ESA section 7.16
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
ESA section 7(a)(2) effectively functions as a tenth criterion a state must satisfy
prior to obtaining NPDES permitting authority under CWA section 402(b).17
In a ﬁve-four decision delivered by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies only to
federal agency “actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or
control.”18 Since section 402(b) of the CWA mandates the EPA grant a state’s
transfer application after a state satisﬁes the nine statutory criteria, the decision
to transfer NPDES permitting authority is nondiscretionary and does not trigger
section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy considerations.19
This case note demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife (NAHB) balances competing public interests and agency actions with the
continued protection of endangered and threatened species and their habitats.20
Speciﬁcally, this case note ﬁrst examines the legislative history surrounding the
ESA’s enactment and demonstrates how the Court’s decision furthers the ESA’s
intent as applied to federal agency actions.21 Second, this case note explains how
the Court’s decision effectively resolved the statutory overlap between the ESA and
the CWA.22 By resolving the statutory overlap between the two statutes, the Court
also resolved a split of authority among the circuits and provided federal courts

14

Id.

15

Id. at 950.

16

Id. at 959.

17

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2525, 2529; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000)
(requiring all federal agencies to insure their actions will not jeopardize listed species).
18

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538.

19

Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (prohibiting federal agencies from undertaking any action that
could jeopardize threatened or endangered species).
20

See infra notes 159-235 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
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with a clearer, more deﬁnitive answer regarding the ESA’s scope.23 Finally, this
case note illustrates the Court’s decision in NAHB should not restrict Congress’s
ability to protect listed species in the future, because the opinion exempts only
those actions that are truly nondiscretionary.24

BACKGROUND
Section 402(b) of the CWA states the EPA “shall” approve a state’s request
for a transfer of NPDES permitting authority upon a showing the state satisﬁed
the nine statutory criteria.25 The statute goes on to state the EPA “shall” approve
a transfer application unless EPA determines the state does not possess sufﬁcient
authority to adequately administer the NPDES program.26 Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA states each federal agency “shall” consult the Secretary of the Interior
to “insure” any agency action will not jeopardize endangered and threatened
species.27 Clearly, the two statutes present conﬂicting mandates and result in a
statutory overlap.28 The U.S. Supreme Court’s early interpretation of the two
statutes indicated a preference for the ESA to preside over all federal agency
actions, regardless of the cost.29 Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however,
have found the ESA inapplicable to federal agency actions in certain limited
circumstances.30 Nevertheless, many courts remained confused about how to
balance the competing interests of the ESA and the CWA, resulting in a split of
authority among the circuits.31

23
See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
NAHB, the circuits were divided regarding whether the ESA imposes a duty to consider listed
species independent of the agency statute. See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
24

See infra notes 224-35 and accompanying text.

25

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).

26

Id.

27

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).

28

See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating NAHB presents a problem of conﬂicting “shalls” and discusses the
proper way to resolve “competing statutory mandates”). The ESA makes it difﬁcult for the EPA
to transfer permitting authority to state ofﬁcials as soon as the State satisﬁes the nine statutory
criteria if the EPA must also insure its transfer decision will not jeopardize listed species since a
consideration of listed species is not one of the nine expressly enumerated statutory criteria set forth
in CWA section 402(b). Id.
29
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978) (reasoning section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA required a permanent halting of the construction and operation of a virtually completed $100
million dam because the dam’s operation would jeopardize a listed species).
30
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (2000); Sherry
L. Bosse, Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA: Testing the Boundaries of Federal Agency Power under the ESA,
36 ENVTL. L. 1025, 1054 (2006) (reasoning ESA section 7(a)(2) is inapplicable when the statute a
federal agency is administering neither provides the agency with authority to consider listed species,
nor provides the agency with sufﬁcient discretion to consider its impact on listed species).
31

See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
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The Clean Water Act
1n 1972, Congress established the CWA as a way to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.32 The CWA
created the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program,
designed to protect the nations’ waters from the discharge of harmful pollutants.33
Under the NPDES program, any individual or organization desiring to discharge
pollutants into the nations’ waters must apply for and receive a permit.34 The
EPA is the agency initially responsible for administering the program within the
United States.35
Recognizing Congress’s policy to protect the rights of states to prevent and
reduce water pollution within their borders, Congress enacted section 402(b) of
the CWA, which authorizes any state to apply for a transfer of NPDES pollution
permitting authority to state ofﬁcials.36 Section 402(b) of the CWA instructs the
governor of each state desiring to administer its own NPDES program to submit
to the EPA a complete description of the plan the state proposes to administer.37
In addition, the state must submit a statement indicating it possesses adequate
authority to carry out the desired program.38 Any state requesting a transfer
of permitting authority to state ofﬁcials must conclusively establish it has the
authority to oversee nine statutory criteria laid out in the CWA.39 Once a state has

32

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).

33

33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a) (2000), 1251(a).

34

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).

35

33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).

36

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1342(b) (stating “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources”).
37

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

38

Id.

39

Id. Section 402(b) of the CWA states that the EPA “shall” approve a transfer application
once the State demonstrates it has the ability achieve the following nine criteria: (1) issue ﬁxed-term
permits that insure compliance with the CWA, and that can be terminated or modiﬁed for cause;
(2) issue permits and inspect, monitor, and require reports to the extent necessary to satisfy section
308 of the CWA; (3) insure the public, and any other state whose waters might be affected by the
transfer, receive notice of each permit application and provide that state with an opportunity to hold
a public hearing; (4) insure the EPA receives notice of each permit application; (5) insure any other
state whose waters might be affected by the issuance of a permit be afforded the opportunity submit
written comments to the state requesting the transfer of authority, and that the permitting state
will notify the affected state in writing if the affected state’s recommendations are not accepted; (6)
insure a permit will not be issued if the Secretary of the Army believes the anchorage and navigation
of navigable waters would be substantially impaired thereby; (7) decrease violations of the permit
program; (8) insure any permit for a discharge from a publicly owned treatment works facility be
accompanied by a statement identifying the character and volume of pollutants being discharged;
and (9) insure any industrial user of any publicly owned treatment works facility will comply with
the CWA. Id.
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satisﬁed these nine criteria, the statute mandates the EPA “shall” transfer NPDES
permitting authority.40

The Endangered Species Act
One year after Congress enacted the CWA it established the ESA to provide
a program for the conservation of endangered and threatened species and their
habitats.41 Section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to cooperate to further
the conservation of listed species.42 In addition, ESA section 7(a)(2) requires
each federal agency to “insure” its actions do not jeopardize threatened and
endangered species or their habitats.43 Furthermore, the Secretaries of the Interior
and Commerce promulgated a joint regulation which states section 7 applies to
all actions involving “discretionary” federal involvement or control.44
Prior to undertaking a federal agency action, an agency must consult the
Secretary of the Interior if the action could potentially jeopardize threatened or
endangered species.45 As soon as practicable upon completion of the consultation
process, the Secretary of the Interior shall provide the federal agency with a written
biological opinion discussing whether the agency action affects listed species.46
If the Secretary determines the proposed agency action could jeopardize listed
species, the Secretary shall suggest possible alternatives which likely would not
violate section 7(a)(2) and which would allow the federal agency to undertake
its proposed action.47 An agency has three options if the Secretary determines
its proposed action would jeopardize listed species: (1) terminate the action;

40

Id. (stating the EPA “shall approve each submitted program unless [it] determines that
adequate authority does not exist” (emphasis added)).
41

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).

42

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).

43

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (stating “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce], insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modiﬁcation
of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be critical” (emphasis added)). The FWS
administers the ESA with respect to species listed under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Interior, while the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers the ESA with respect to
species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2007). The
affected species in NAHB involved species under the jurisdiction of the FWS, thus any reference to
the “Secretary” in this case note implies the Secretary of the Interior. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (2007).
44
50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007) (stating ESA section 7 “[applies] to all actions in which there is
discretionary federal involvement or control” (emphasis added)).
45

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

46

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).

47

Id.
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(2) implement the proposed alternative; or (3) seek an exemption from the
Endangered Species Committee.48
Because both the ESA and the CWA impose conﬂicting statutory mandates
upon federal agencies, a clear overlap exists between the ESA and the CWA.49
CWA section 402(b) states the EPA “shall” grant a state’s transfer request once
the state satisﬁes the nine statutory criteria; ESA section 7(a)(2) states all agencies
“shall” insure their actions will not jeopardize listed species or their habitats.50 As a
result, courts have had difﬁculty in determining which statute, if any, should yield
to better serve Congress’s intent.51

Court Applies ESA Section 7(a)(2) to “All” Agency Actions
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ﬁrst major attempt to determine the extent of
the ESA’s reach arose in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.52 Hill presented the
issue of whether the ESA required the Court to enjoin the construction of a
nearly complete federal dam upon the Secretary of the Interior’s determination
that the dam’s operation would eradicate a listed species.53 The Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) nearly completed the Tellico Dam when a researcher discovered
a previously unknown species, the snail darter, in the waters near the dam.54
Believing the dam’s construction and operation would either eradicate the snail
darter or destroy its critical habitat, thus resulting in the creature’s demise, the
48
16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1536(b)(3)(A), 1536(h). Congress established the Endangered
Species Committee (Committee) which consists of seven Cabinet-level members authorized to
grant exemptions under section 7 of the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h). Congress realized certain
species must necessarily submit to important agency actions, thus Congress granted the Committee
the power to determine when it is acceptable for a species to become extinct in order to allow a
beneﬁcial agency action to proceed. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
49
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007)
(stating an “agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates” set forth in ESA section
7(a)(2) and CWA section 402(b)).
50

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (stating the EPA “shall approve each submitted program unless
[it] determines that adequate authority does not exist” to meet the nine statutory requirements);
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (stating “[e]ach Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize” listed species).
51
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2533-37 (indicating since Congress enacted
CWA section 402(b) prior to enacting ESA section 7(a)(2), the CWA should prevail because holding
otherwise would effectively repeal the CWA by adding a tenth criterion to the statute’s exclusive list
of factors).
52

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978).

53

Id. In 1967, Congress appropriated and spent over $100 million for the construction of the
Tellico Dam. Id. at 157. The Tellico Dam involved a multipurpose development project designed to
increase shoreline development, generate electricity, and provide recreation and ﬂood control. Id.
54
Id. at 159. The snail darter, a three-inch, tannish-colored ﬁsh, numbered approximately
10,000 to 15,000 when a researcher discovered the ﬁsh. Id. A University of Tennessee ichthyologist
located the snail darter when the TVA nearly completed construction of the Tellico Dam. Id. at
158-59.
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Supreme Court determined the TVA would violate the ESA if it operated the
dam as planned.55 According to the Court, the dam’s continued operation would
violate the ESA because Congress, in enacting the ESA, clearly intended to afford
threatened and endangered species the highest of priorities.56

Congress Creates an Exception to Section 7(a)(2)
Concerned the Hill Court’s application of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to “all”
federal agency actions created an overly-broad standard, Congress amended the
ESA and established the Endangered Species Committee (Committee).57 Congress
granted the Committee the power to authorize exemptions from section 7(a)(2)
of the ESA.58 An exemption issued by the Committee authorizes the requesting
agency to undertake its proposed action, despite such action jeopardizing or even
eradicating endangered and threatened species or their habitats.59
The Committee represents the single statutory exception to the stringent
ESA requirements.60 The Committee, comprised of six high-ranking cabinet
members and a presidential nominee from each effected state, has the authority to
balance the interest of endangered species with those of the public.61 In amending

55

Id. at 171-72.

56

Id. at 173.
One would be hard pressed to ﬁnd a statutory provision whose terms were any
plainer than those in [section] 7 of the [ESA]. Its very words afﬁrmatively command
all federal agencies ‘to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them
do not jeopardize the continued existence’ of an endangered species or ‘result in the
destruction or modiﬁcation of habitat of such species.’ This language admits of no
exception.

Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) (emphasis in the original)).
57

16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (2000); see Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Court’s holding, preventing the operation of a virtually complete $100
million dam due to the discovery of an endangered species of snail darter, “absurd”); see also Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (D.N.M. 2002) (stating Congress
created the Committee as an exception to the stringent requirements of ESA section 7(a)(2) because
the broad ramiﬁcations of the ESA concerned Congress). The Committee members include: (1)
the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) the Secretary of the Army; (3) the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors; (4) the Administrator of the EPA; (5) the Secretary of the Interior; (6) the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and (7) a presidential
nominee from each state effected by the petition for an exemption from the requirements of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h).
58

16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h).

59

16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).

60

Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (stating Congress created the
Committee as the “single exception to the stringent requirements of the ESA”). Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA requires all federal agencies to “insure” their actions will not jeopardize listed species or
their habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
61

16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h).
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the ESA, Congress speciﬁcally provided the Committee, not the courts, with the
power to grant exemptions under section 7(a)(2).62 Thus, even after the creation
of the Committee, Congress still required the federal courts to apply the ESA
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hill.63 This meant continuing to give
endangered species the highest of priorities regardless of the cost.64
However, even if an agency’s proposed action could jeopardize listed species,
Congress entrusted the Committee with authority to grant exemptions to
ESA section 7(a)(2) if the Committee determines the agency has met certain
requirements.65 Additionally, the Committee must establish reasonable mitigation
and enhancement measures to minimize the adverse effects of the agency
action upon listed species and their critical habitats.66 If the agency satisﬁes the
Committee’s mitigation measures, the Committee may grant an exemption to the
requirements of section 7(a)(2), thereby allowing the agency to proceed with its
proposed action.67

Circuit Split of Authority
Even after Congress created the Endangered Species Committee as a way
to limit the overly broad application of the ESA, many courts remained unsure
regarding the extent of the ESA’s reach.68 This resulted in a split of authority

62

Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.

63

Id. (stating Congress “speciﬁcally and exclusively” delegated the power to balance the interests
of the public with the interests of endangered species to the Committee, rather than to the federal
courts; thus, the federal courts must continue to give endangered species the highest of priorities
“whatever the cost”).
64

Id.

65

16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A). An agency must establish four requirements in order to receive
an exemption from the Committee:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action; (ii) the
beneﬁts of such action clearly outweigh the beneﬁts of alternative courses of action
consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the
public interest; (iii) the action is of regional or national signiﬁcance; and (iv) neither
the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d) [of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA].
Id. Section 7(d) of the ESA states the Federal agency and the exemption permit applicant must
not make any “irreversible or irretrievable” commitment of resources that would have the affect of
prohibiting the implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d).
66
16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B). The subsection lists several reasonable mitigation measures
including live propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement. Id.
67

16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1536(h)(1).

68

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 203 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the Court’s holding as a “sweeping construction” of the ESA); see Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047
(indicating circuits have reached divergent conclusions).
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among the circuits.69 In particular, the circuit split involved the question of
whether the ESA provides an afﬁrmative grant of authority to agencies to protect
listed species.70 One line of cases, followed by the First Circuit and the Eighth
Circuit, suggests ESA section 7(a)(2) confers additional authority on agencies
to consider listed species.71 Under this approach, an agency possessing sufﬁcient
discretion to consider listed species must give species protection the highest of
priorities if the agency action could jeopardize listed species.72 In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have determined the ESA does not confer any
additional authority on the agencies.73 The Fifth and D.C. Circuit cases held an
agency only needs to consider its impact to listed species if the statute in question
speciﬁcally provides for the consideration of species.74
One line of cases in the split, followed by the Fifth and D.C. Circuit, holds
an agency does not have authority to consider the agency action’s impact on
listed species if the agency interprets a statute without a species consideration
provision.75 In Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v.
FERC (FERC), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
69

See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047 (stating the First and Eighth Circuits interpreted ESA section
7(a)(2) to confer additional authority on agencies to consider species, while the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits held section 7(a)(2) does not grant agencies additional authority). Compare Am. Forest &
Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating ESA section 7(a)(2) does not grant
an agency authority to take listed species into account when the agency is interpreting a statute that
does not provide some authority for the agency to do so), and Platte River Whooping Crane Critical
Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding ESA section 7(a)(2) does
not confer additional powers upon agencies to consider listed species), with Defenders of Wildlife
v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding ESA section 7(a)(2) imposed substantial
obligations upon agencies to consider the effect of their actions on listed species), and Conservation
Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714 (1st Cir. 1979) (determining ESA
section 7(a)(2) imposes an obligation upon agencies to protect listed species).
70

See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047 (stating the circuit split involved the issue of whether ESA
section 7 provides agencies with additional authority to protect listed species).
71
Id. The courts that found ESA section 7(a)(2) conferred additional authority on agencies to
take species considerations into account did so because the statute those agencies were interpreting
already provided for limited species consideration. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
Thus, by holding section 7(a)(2) applied to the particular statutes, the Courts essentially conferred
“additional authority” on the agencies to consider their impacts on listed species. See infra notes
84-90 and accompanying text.
72
Conservation Law Found. of New England, 623 F.2d at 714 (interpreting the OCSLA which
possessed sufﬁcient discretion for the agency to consider listed species because the OCSLA required
approval of an oil and gas exploration plan unless approval would likely cause serious harm or
danger to life); Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047 (stating ESA section 7(a)(2) requires agencies with
sufﬁcient discretion to give listed species the highest of priorities).
73
Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047 (stating the ESA does not bestow any additional authority
upon agencies to consider listed species).
74
See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth and D.C. Circuit
decisions).
75

See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth and D.C. Circuit
decisions).
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Circuit held section 7 of the ESA does not confer additional powers upon agencies
to consider potential negative impacts to endangered and threatened species.76
The court stated the ESA “does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by
its enabling act.”77 According to the court, the statute does not require agencies to
go beyond their statutory authority to carry out the ESA’s purposes.78
Six years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied
on the D.C. Circuit’s FERC holding.79 The Fifth Circuit determined the ESA
does not grant an agency authority to take species into account when the agency
interprets a statute that does not provide some authority for the agency to do so.80
The court determined the ESA does not create additional authority to consider
listed species, but merely requires agencies to use their existing authority to
protect species.81 The court applied section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to section 402(b)
of the CWA and determined ESA section 7 does not grant the EPA the authority
to add additional criteria to the CWA requirements.82 Rather, ESA section 7
merely requires the EPA to consult with the FWS before undertaking any agency
action.83
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus Authority
(Conservation Law) determined ESA section 7(a)(2) imposed an afﬁrmative
obligation on agencies to protect species.84 Conservation Law discussed the issue
of whether ESA section 7 applied to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA).85 OCSLA required the approval of an oil and gas exploration plan

76

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
77

Id. (emphasis in the original) (stating agencies are not required to do “whatever it takes” to
protect listed species because agencies are not required to look beyond the powers Congress granted
them in their enabling acts, and agencies have no authority to consider listed species when Congress
did not confer any statutory authority on the agencies to take species into account).
78

Id.

79

Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning unless
the statute an agency is interpreting provides for some, albeit limited, authority to consider listed
species, the agency is not required to consider its impact on endangered and threatened species).
80

Id.

81

Id. (stating “the ESA serves not as a front of new authority, but as something far more
modest: a directive to agencies to channel their existing authority in a particular direction” (emphasis
in the original)).
82

Id. at 298.

83

Id. at 299.

84

Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714 (1st Cir.

1979).
85

Id.
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unless such approval would “probably cause serious harm or danger to life.”86 The
First Circuit determined the ESA and OCSLA were “complimentary” because the
OCSLA provided some consideration for listed species.87 However, Conservation
Law did not address whether ESA section 7(a)(2) grants agencies additional
authority to consider listed species under a statute that does not explicitly provide
for the consideration of species.88
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA held the ESA “impose[d] substantial and continuing
obligations on federal agencies” to consider the effects of their actions on listed
species.89 Once again, however, the Eighth Circuit did not address the question of
whether the ESA applies to a statute that does not, itself, allow an agency to take
into account potential impacts to species.90
Even though the First Circuit and the Eighth Circuit determined the ESA
confers additional powers on agencies, these circuits did not address the same issue
presented in the Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit cases, resulting in an important
distinction.91 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA further
muddied the waters surrounding the ESA’s scope by holding ESA section 7(a)(2)
applies to CWA section 402(b).92 Unlike the statutes involved in the First Circuit
and Eighth Circuit decisions, nothing within the text of CWA section 402(b)

86

Id. at 715 n.2; Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000); see
43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2000) (setting forth requirements for plan approval).
87
Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc., 623 F.2d at 714; 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)
(2)(A)(i)(2005) (requiring approval of an exploration plan unless approval would “probably cause
serious harm or danger to life”). Although section 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) provided a lower standard for
species protection than ESA section 7(a)(2)’s “no jeopardy” mandate, the First Circuit held the ESA
applied to the OCSLA because it provided for limited species consideration. Conservation Law
Found. of New England, Inc., 623 F.2d at 714.
88

Bosse, supra note 30, at 1048 (stating because OCSLA provides for the consideration of
species, Conservation Law did not address whether the ESA applies to a statute, such as the CWA,
that does not provide for the consideration of species).
89

Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding the agency’s
compliance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not exempt the agency
from compliance under the ESA).
90

See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1050 (stating the court found the ESA applies when an agency
acts under a statute with less-protective species standards, but the court did not address whether
ESA section 7(a)(2) confers any additional power to protect species).
91
Id. at 1054 (stating while ESA section 7(a)(2) imposes a substantive mandate upon agencies
to insure their actions will not jeopardize listed species, this mandate only applies if an agency action
possess sufﬁcient discretion to allow the agency to take species into account).
92
See id. (reasoning the Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the important distinction in the
split, that ESA section 7(a)(2) applies only if an agency action includes sufﬁcient discretion to allow
the agency to consider listed species, resulted in the Ninth Circuit’s failure to explain how the ESA
could confer additional authority on an agency to consider listed species when interpreting a statute
that does not provide discretion for the agency to consider additional factors in its decision).
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requires federal agencies to consider their impacts to listed species.93 Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision necessitated the Supreme Court’s involvement in the
principal case to shed some light on this complicated issue.94

PRINCIPAL CASE
National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife presented
the question of whether ESA section 7(a)(2) effectively imposes an additional
requirement that states must satisfy to obtain pollution permitting power under the
CWA.95 The EPA originally granted the State of Arizona’s request to administer its
NPDES program with regard to Arizona waterways.96 Respondent Defenders of
Wildlife (Defenders) subsequently ﬁled a petition for review of the EPA’s decision
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.97 The Ninth Circuit
vacated the EPA’s decision, holding the EPA had the authority and the obligation
to consider the potential harm to threatened and endangered species in making
the transfer decision.98 The Ninth Circuit determined the EPA failed to take into
account the possible jeopardy to listed species and held the EPA made an arbitrary
and capricious decision.99
Petitioner National Association of Home Builders (Home Builders) appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.100 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because the Ninth Circuit’s construction of ESA section 7(a)(2) contradicts the
construction adopted by other Courts of Appeals.101 The United States Supreme
Court began its discussion by addressing whether the EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in granting the State of Arizona’s request for pollution permitting

93
Compare Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714-16
(1st Cir. 1979) (interpreting the OCSLA which required approval of an exploration plan unless
approval would “probably cause serious harm or danger to life”), with Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA,
420 F.3d 946, 959-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting CWA section 402(b) which does not include a
species consideration provision).
94
Mary B. Hubner, Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA: Reconciling the Endangered Species Act and
Clean Water Act or Further Confusing the Statutory Overlap?, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 433, 456-57 (2006)
(stating Supreme Court review would likely be necessary to resolve the statutory overlap between
the CWA and the ESA).
95

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2007).

96

Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 954.

97

Id. at 954-55; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review an EPA transfer decision under CWA section 402(b)).
98

Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 950.

99

Id. (holding the EPA’s transfer decision was arbitrary and capricious because it had the
authority to consider jeopardy to listed species and failed to properly do so when it granted Arizona’s
transfer request).
100

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2529.

101

Id. (stating the Court granted certiorari to resolve the conﬂict among the Courts of
Appeals).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 5

494

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

authority.102 The Court noted it should uphold an agency decision of “less than ideal
clarity” so long as the “agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”103 According
to Defenders, the EPA’s path was not reasonably discernable because the agency
changed its mind regarding its section 7(a)(2) obligations when determining
whether to grant the transfer request.104 The Court, however, reasoned that, as
long as agencies follow the proper procedures, agencies may change their minds.105
Furthermore, the Court asserted the fact that a preliminary agency determination
“is later overruled at a higher level . . . does not render the decisionmaking process
arbitrary and capricious.”106
The Court then addressed the substantive statutory question raised by
petitioners, Home Builders.107 Home Builders argued the use of the word “shall”
in section 402(b) of the CWA requires mandatory agency action once the state
satisﬁes the nine statutory criteria.108 The Court agreed, holding the statutory
language mandatory and the list of criteria a state must satisfy to obtain a transfer
of pollution permitting authority exclusive.109 The Court reasoned the word “shall”
typically does not allow room for discretion; rather, it indicates a requirement an
individual or state must meet.110 Similarly, the word “shall” appears in section
7(a)(2) of the ESA, which requires agencies to insure their actions are unlikely to
jeopardize listed species or their habitats.111 The use of the word “shall” in both

102
Id. at 2529-31; Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (stating
“the reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, ﬁndings, and conclusions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the procedure agencies follow to establish rules
and regulations and provides for judicial review of agency decisions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96, 70106. The APA speciﬁcally allows the reviewing court to set aside agency decisions that are arbitrary
and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A).
103

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. ArkansasBest Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
104

Id. Defenders argued that the EPA’s decision was of “less than ideal clarity” because the EPA
engaged in ESA section 7 consultations and later determined that CWA section 402(b) required it
to approve Arizona’s transfer request as soon as the State satisﬁed the nine criteria. See id.
105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 2531.

108

Opening Brief of Petitioners National Association of Home Builders, et. al. at 25, Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (Nos. 06-340, 06-549), 2007 WL 549100; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(2000). Section 402(b) states “[t]he [EPA] shall approve each such submitted program unless [it]
determines that adequate authority does not exist.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2000) (emphasis added).
109

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2531.

110

Id. (citing Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

111

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Section 7(a)(2) provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall
. . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize” endangered or threatened species or their habitats. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss2/5

14

Kisling: Environmental Law - A Tale of Two Conflicting Mandates: Limiting

2008

CASE NOTE

495

the ESA and the CWA results in the imposition of conﬂicting statutory mandates
upon federal agencies.112
In resolving the contradiction regarding the use of the word “shall” in both
the ESA and the CWA, the Court ﬁrst considered the general presumption against
an implied repeal of a statute.113 The Court noted that “repeals by implication are
not favored” in the law.114 Thus, courts will not construe a later enacted statute
(such as the ESA) to repeal an earlier enacted statute (such as the CWA) unless
Congress clearly intended to repeal the earlier enacted statute.115 According to the
Court, construing section 7(a)(2) of the ESA literally—requiring every agency to
insure its actions do not jeopardize listed species—would impliedly repeal section
402(b) of the CWA by adding a tenth criterion that states must satisfy before they
can obtain a transfer of pollution permitting authority.116
Furthermore, the Court found it impossible for an agency to simultaneously
obey the conﬂicting mandates outlined in section 7(a)(2) of the ESA and section
402(b) of the CWA.117 The Court went on to note the presumption against implied
repeals does not, by itself, indicate which statute should prevail.118 Consequently,
the Court conducted a review of the FWS’ regulations to determine which statute,
if any, should prevail.119 The FWS, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior,
promulgated a regulation that states the ESA section 7 requirements “apply to
all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”120
According to the Court, by factoring in the provisions of this regulation, ESA
section 7(a)(2) would only take effect when an agency action results from the use
of agency discretion.121
Defenders argued the Court’s decision in Hill, holding section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA prohibited the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from operating a dam
due to the negative impact such operation would have on the endangered snail
112

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2531-32 (determining CWA section 402(b) and
ESA section 7(a)(2) are contradictory to one another because both impose conﬂicting statutory
mandates on federal agencies).
113
Id. at 2532-33 (discussing the presumption against “implied repeals” which occurs when a
later enacted statute operates to amend or repeal an earlier statutory provision).
114

Id. at 2532.

115

Id. at 2532 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)).

116

Id.

117

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2534.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 2533-37.

120

50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007) (emphasis added). The FWS promulgated the regulation in
cooperation with the NMFS, which acts on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.01(b).
121

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2533.
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darter, required the Court to decide in Defenders’ favor.122 The Court, however,
found Hill distinguishable from the present action because Hill did not address
the question of whether the FWS’ regulation applies to nondiscretionary, as well
as discretionary, agency actions.123 Rather, Hill involved a discretionary project,
which the Court already determined ESA section 7(a)(2) applies.124
Next, Defenders argued even if section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies only to
discretionary agency actions, the EPA’s decision to transfer pollution permitting
authority to Arizona involved the use of agency discretion.125 According to
Defenders, the EPA’s transfer decision was not “entirely mechanical” and involved
“some exercise of judgment” as to whether Arizona met the criteria set forth in
CWA section 402(b).126 The Court found this argument unpersuasive because
section 402(b) does not grant an agency the discretion to consider an “entirely
separate” criterion when deciding whether to grant a state’s transfer request.127
Finally, Defenders argued the section 402(b) criteria incorporate references to
wildlife conservation that bring ESA section 7(a)(2) under the purview of agency
discretion.128 The Court also rejected this argument on the ground that nothing
in the text of CWA section 402(b) permits the EPA to consider the potential
danger to listed species “as an end in itself ” when deciding whether to grant a
state’s application for a transfer of permitting power.129

Justice Stevens’s Dissent
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, disagreed with the majority’s opinion on the ground that the Court
should attempt to give full effect to each of the two competing statutes, if possible.130
The dissent stated “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.”131 In advancing its position, the dissent indicated ESA
section 7(a)(2) and CWA section 402(b) can co-exist and provided two separate

122

Brief for Respondents Defenders of Wildlife, et. al. at 38, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127
S. Ct. 2518 (Nos. 06-340, 06-549), 2007 WL 951129; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
173 (1978).
123

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2536.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 2537.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2537.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 2538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

131

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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approaches to harmonize the two conﬂicting statutes.132 Finally, the dissent argued
that even if the Court should only apply section 7(a)(2) to discretionary agency
actions, the EPA’s transfer decision constituted a discretionary act, and thus falls
under the purview of the ESA.133
The dissent’s ﬁrst argument centered on the Court’s decision in Hill, where
the Court determined the ESA should receive ﬁrst “priority over the primary
missions of federal agencies.”134 The dissent noted the Hill Court plainly held
section 7 admits “no exception.”135 According to the dissent, no exception to the
protections granted to endangered species under ESA section 7 should exist.136
Thus, forming an exception for nondiscretionary agency actions goes against the
precedent set by the Court in Hill and the ESA’s statutory text.137
Reasoning the Hill decision granted the highest of priorities to endangered
species, the dissent stated the CWA should yield to the ESA if necessary.138
Nevertheless, the dissent searched for a way for the two statutes to coexist.139
The dissent reasoned the plain language of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 does not limit the
provisions of the ESA only to discretionary actions.140 Rather, the dissent stated
that while 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 states ESA section 7(a)(2) applies to discretionary
actions, nothing in the regulation’s text prohibits the application of section 7(a)(2)
to nondiscretionary actions.141 To advance this point, the dissent relied on 50
C.F.R. § 402.02, which states an agency “action means all activities or programs
of any kind authorized . . . by Federal agencies.”142 By deﬁnition, the term “action”
applies to all agency activities, and the Court’s reading of the term “discretionary”
as a limitation on “action” contradicts the FWS’s own regulations, according to
the dissent.143
132
Id. at 2539-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating there are two possible ways in which the ESA
and the CWA can co-exist: (1) an extensive consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, and (2)
requiring the EPA and the FWS to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) setting forth
continuing obligations to consider impacts to listed species).
133

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2548-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

134

Id. at 2538 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).

135

Id. at 2539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

136

Id. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

137

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

138

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

139

Id. at 2541-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

140

Id. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007) (stating section 7 of the ESA
applies to “all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control”).
141
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2542 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.03.
142
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2543 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02 (2007) (internal quotations omitted)).
143

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Next, the dissent argued two possible ways existed to give effect to both
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA and section 402(b) of the CWA without sacriﬁcing
either statute.144 First, the text of ESA section 7(a)(2) provides that each federal
agency shall consult the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to insure its actions
will not jeopardize endangered and threatened species.145 If, after consulting the
Secretary, the agency determines the proposed action will not affect listed species,
the agency satisﬁes its obligation under section 7(a)(2).146 If, however, the Secretary
determines the agency action could potentially harm listed species, the Secretary
shall suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that would not violate section
7(a)(2) and that would allow the agency to proceed with its proposed action.147
In the rare circumstance that no “reasonable and prudent alternatives exist,” the
agency could consult the Committee, which has the authority to grant exemptions
to ESA section 7(a)(2).148 Second, an agency may harmonize the provisions of the
ESA and the CWA by entering into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that
details the particulars of an agency’s “oversight duties.”149 Entering into a MOA
would allow a state to obtain control of the NPDES permitting system within its
borders while still allowing the EPA to protect endangered species in accordance
with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.150
Finally, the dissent argued even if section 7(a)(2) only applies to discretionary
agency actions, the EPA engaged in a discretionary action subject to the provisions
of the ESA when it transferred permitting power to Arizona.151 The dissent cited
the Hill decision, in which the Court held a “federal statute using the word ‘shall’
will sometimes allow room for discretion.”152 Thus, according to the dissent, the
144

Id. at 2544 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

145

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The FWS is responsible for administering the ESA with respect
to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior; the NMFS administers the ESA
with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11,
222.101(a), 223.102, 402.01(b) (2007).
146

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

147

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

148

Id. at 2546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

149

Id. at 2547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Regarding the EPA’s oversight duties, the MOA may
include additional terms, conditions, or agreements “relevant to the administration and enforcement
of the State’s regulatory program.” 40 C.F.R. § 123.24(a) (2007). For example, additional terms or
conditions could specify the “frequency and content of reports, documents and other information”
which the state must submit to the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 123.24(b)(3) (2007). Additionally, terms or
conditions could provide for coordination and compliance monitoring activities by the state and by
EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 123.24(b)(4)(i) (2007).
150

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). EPA must approve
an MOA prior to transferring NPDES permitting authority. Id. As a result, EPA can include a
provision in the MOA allowing the EPA to protect endangered species, even after EPA has transferred
permitting authority. Id.
151

Id. at 2548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

152

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 211-12

(1978)).
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Court should take a closer look at the nine speciﬁed criteria in section 402(b) of the
CWA to determine whether there is room for discretion within the statute.153

Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens’s dissent but reserved judgment
regarding whether section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to all possible agency
actions.154 Justice Breyer indicated section 7(a)(2) likely does not apply to all
agency actions, especially those actions undertaken by totally unrelated agencies,
such as the Internal Revenue Service.155
In summary, the Court in NAHB concluded that ESA section 7(a)(2) does
not apply to the CWA.156 The Court reached its conclusion after determining
section 7(a)(2) does not apply to nondiscretionary agency actions.157 In particular,
the Court reasoned an agency does not have sufﬁcient authority to “insure” its
actions will not jeopardize listed species when the agency lacks the discretion to
consider the action’s impact on such species.158

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Courts’ 1978 decision in Hill presented a broad interpretation
of the ESA as applying to all federal agency actions, without exception,
and regardless of cost.159 Over the years, the courts, as well as Congress, have
attempted to limit the overarching provisions of the ESA to prevent the “absurd
result” that came about in Hill from occurring in the future.160 However, not
until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in NAHB did the courts receive clear

153

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

154

Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

155

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

156

Id. at 2538.

157

Id. at 2533-36.

158

Id. at 2534-35 (stating “when an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply
lacks the power to ‘insure’ that such action will not jeopardize endangered species” (emphasis in the
original)).
159

See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (D.N.M. 2002) (stating
the broad reach of the ESA after the Supreme Court’s holding in Hill concerned Congress).
160

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 196 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority’s holding, which prevented the operation of a virtually complete $100 million dam due to
the discovery of an endangered species of snail darter, as “absurd”); Platte River Whooping Crane
Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding ESA section
7(a)(2) does not confer additional authority on agencies to consider negative impacts to listed
species); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (2000) (granting the Endangered Species Committee authority
to grant exemptions to the ESA).
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and logical precedent to follow when determining the extent of the ESA’s reach.161
The NAHB Court concluded the ESA does not apply to statutes that do not grant
agency discretion to consider impacts on listed species.162 In doing so, the Court
resolved the statutory overlap that existed between the ESA and the CWA and
indirectly reconciled the split of authority among the circuits.163

Resolution of the Statutory Overlap
The Supreme Court correctly determined the “no jeopardy” provision in
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA does not apply to CWA section 402(b)’s statutory
mandate.164 In doing so, the Court resolved the problematic statutory overlap
between the ESA and the CWA.165 The Court arrived at its decision after
determining the ESA applies only to discretionary agency actions.166 The legislative
history surrounding the ESA’s enactment indicates the section 7 phrase, “utilize
their authorities,” requires agencies to “insure” their actions do not jeopardize
listed species only when they have discretion to do so, but not when faced with a
nondiscretionary statutory mandate, such as the CWA.167 The EPA does not have
discretion to “insure” its actions do not jeopardize listed species when determining
whether to grant a State’s transfer request because CWA section 402(b) does not
contain a species consideration provision.168 Thus, because the EPA does not have

161
See Hubner, supra note 94, at 457 (stating determination of the extent of the EPA’s authority
under the EPA likely necessitates Supreme Court Review).
162
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (indicating a transfer of NPDES
permitting authority does not trigger ESA section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy requirement because a
transfer of permitting authority is not discretionary).
163
See infra notes 164-223 and accompanying text. Even though the NAHB Court did not
directly decide the question presented in the circuit split—whether the ESA provides an afﬁrmative
grant of authority to consider listed species—the Court indirectly resolved the circuit split by
holding that ESA section 7 only applies to discretionary agency actions. See infra notes 212-23 and
accompanying text. Consequently, ESA section 7 does not apply where the agency does not possess
sufﬁcient discretion to consider listed species, and thus, ESA section 7 cannot confer additional
authority on agencies to consider listed species if the agencies do not possess sufﬁcient discretion to
consider species. See infra notes 212-33 and accompanying text.
164
See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1054 (reasoning ESA section 7(a)(2) does not apply to
nondiscretionary agency actions such as the CWA); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). CWA section
402(b) mandates a transfer of permitting authority to state ofﬁcials once the state satisﬁes the nine
statutory criteria. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
165
See infra notes 164-223 and accompanying text (discussing how the NAHB Court’s decision
resolved the statutory overlap between the ESA and the CWA).
166

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538.

167

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 18 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (stating a new ESA section 7(a)
was created, which “essentially restates section 7 of existing law”); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1978)
(requiring all federal agencies shall “utilize their authorities” to carry out the purposes of the ESA).
168
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). None of the nine criteria enumerated in CWA section 402(b) allow
an agency to consider its impact on listed species. Id.
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the authority to consider listed species, and because an agency must have some
discretion to consider impacts to species to trigger ESA section 7 requirements,
ESA section 7(a)(2) clearly applies only to discretionary agency actions.169

Agencies Must “Utilize Their Authorities” to Protect Species
In 1973 when Congress originally enacted the ESA, section 7 obligations
required all federal agencies to “utilize their authorities” to further the protection
of endangered species.170 While the phrase “utilize their authorities” currently
appears only in section 7(a)(1) of the ESA, the legislature clearly intended for
this phrase to apply to section 7(a)(2) as well.171 In its original form, section 7
obligated federal agencies to carry out conservation programs and to avoid
jeopardizing listed species.172 Later, in 1978, Congress amended the ESA and split
the original section 7 into separate subsections.173 Subsection 7(a) in the 1978
version of the ESA contained essentially the same language as the original 1973
version of ESA section 7.174 Once again in 1979, Congress amended the ESA and
further divided section 7(a) into subsections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2).175 In the current
version of the ESA, section 7(a)(1) requires agencies to “utilize their authorities”
to further conservation efforts, while section 7(a)(2) imposes the “no jeopardy”
requirement on agency actions.176
As petitioners, Home Builders, in NAHB correctly argued, Congress
intended for the phrase “utilize their authorities” to apply to both subsection

169
See infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text (explaining ESA section 7 is inapplicable
when Congress fails to provide an agency with discretion under a given statute to consider listed
species).
170

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973) (stating all federal agencies “shall . . . utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this act by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species . . . and by taking such action necessary to insure that [their actions]
do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened species”).
171
See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (indicating the legislature’s intent for the
phrase “utilize their authorities” to apply to subsection 7(a)(2)).
172

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973).

173

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1978).

174

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973) (directing all federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this act by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species . . . and by taking such action necessary to insure that [their actions]
do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened species”);
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1978) (requiring all federal agencies “shall . . . utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species . . . . Each Federal agency shall, . . . insure that any [agency action]
does not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species”).
175

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1979).

176

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2000).
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7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2).177 According to the Conference Report that accompanied
the 1978 Amendments, the new subsection 7(a) “essentially restates section 7 of
existing law.”178 Consequently, even though Congress set forth the “no jeopardy”
requirement in a separate sentence that did not contain the phrase “utilize their
authorities,” the 1978 legislative history indicates Congress’s intent to preserve the
substantive requirements of section 7’s original form.179 The fact that Congress
amended ESA section 7(a) again in 1979 does not undermine this intent because
the 1979 amendments did not substantively alter section 7(a).180 Accordingly, the
legislative history surrounding the ESA’s enactment clearly indicates an agency’s
ability to “utilize [its] authorities” under existing law continues to limit an agency’s
duty to “insure” its actions do not jeopardize listed species.181

ESA Section 7 Applies Only to “Discretionary” Agency Actions
ESA section 7(a)(1)’s requirement that agencies must “utilize their authorities”
to further the conservation of threatened or endangered species does not mandate
that agencies must do “whatever it takes” to protect species.182 Rather, section
7(a)(1) merely requires agencies utilize the authority Congress granted them to
further conservation efforts.183 According to the D.C. Circuit in FERC, the ESA
“does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling act” and
177
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 18 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating the 1978 amendments
were a restatement of the existing ESA section 7 even though the 1978 amendments divided section
7 into subsections).
178
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 18 (Conf. Rep.); Brief for Petitioner Environmental Protection
Agency at 32, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (Nos.
06-340, 06-549), 2007 WL 542243 (stating Congress, in rewording ESA section 7, “did not seek to
expand the scope of federal agencies’ no-jeopardy and consultation duties in potentially far reaching
ways, but rather intended to preserve the substance of the requirements in their prior form”).
179
Brief for Petitioner Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 178, at 32 (noting the
phrase “utilize their authorities” attached to the “no jeopardy” requirement in ESA section 7’s
original form).
180
Id. at 33. In 1978, ESA section 7(a) stated all federal agencies “shall . . . utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species and threatened species . . . . Each Federal agency shall, . . . insure that any
[agency action] does not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1978). In 1979, Congress divided ESA section 7(a) into subsections.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1979). ESA section 7(a)(1) stated all federal agencies “shall . . . utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species and threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). ESA section 7(a)(2) required
all federal agencies “shall . . . insure that any [agency action] is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
181

Brief for Petitioner Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 178, at 30-33.

182

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating ESA section 7 requires agencies to “utilize their authorities” to carry out
the statute’s objectives, but it “does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling
act” (emphasis added)).
183

Id.
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thus does not confer additional power upon agencies to protect listed species.184
Although section 7(a)(2) of the ESA mandates that all agencies “insure” that their
actions do not jeopardize listed species, this obligation only applies if an agency
has sufﬁcient discretion to consider listed species.185
Regulations promulgated jointly by the FWS and the NMFS speciﬁcally state
section 7 of the ESA applies to “all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control.”186 The term “discretionary” refers to an act or duty
“involving an exercise of judgment and choice.”187 As Justice Stevens correctly
articulated in the dissenting opinion, this regulation does not state ESA section
7(a)(2) “only” applies to discretionary actions.188 However, sufﬁcient authority
exists to indicate section 7(a)(2) does not apply to nondiscretionary actions.189 In
fact, the regulation becomes superﬂuous and unnecessary if ESA section 7(a)(2)
applies to discretionary actions.190 Nothing within the text of section 7(a)(2) or
the other agency regulations indicate the ESA excludes discretionary actions.191
Consequently, the FWS did not need a separate regulation to bring discretionary
actions within the scope of the ESA because they were never explicitly excluded.192

184

Id.

185

Brian P. Gaffney, A Divided Duty: The EPA’s Dilemma under the Endangered Species Act and
Clean Water Act Concerning the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 26 REV. LITIG. 487,
498 (2007) (stating that if an agency action is nondiscretionary, “ESA section 7(a)(2) would not
apply”).
186

50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007) (emphasis added).

187

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004).

188

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2418, 2541-42 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
189

E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998)
(reasoning the ESA does not apply to nondiscretionary agency actions); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt,
83 F.3d 1068, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1996) (reasoning an agency action does not exist, as contemplated
under ESA section 7(a)(2), when an agency lacks discretion); Sierra Club. v. Babbit, 65 F.3d 1502,
1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (indicating ESA section 7(a)(2) cannot apply when a discretionary agency
action does not exist).
190

See Gaffney, supra note 185, at 497-98 (stating where an agency lacks discretion, “to require
compliance with section 7 of the ESA would be an exercise in futility” (internal quotations omitted)).
Canons of statutory construction instruct courts to construe statutes so that “no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superﬂuous, void, or insigniﬁcant.” TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
191
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2535-36; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000)
(listing no section or text stating ESA section 7 excludes discretionary actions).
192

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2535-36 (stating no need for a separate regulation
to bring discretionary actions within the reach of the ESA since nothing within the text of the ESA,
or the regulations interpreting that section, speciﬁcally excludes discretionary actions from the ESA’s
reach); 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007) (stating ESA applies to “all actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control”).
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Thus, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 becomes unnecessary unless it serves to exclude
nondiscretionary actions from the ESA’s reach.193
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that limiting the ESA’s
application to discretionary actions upsets the Supreme Court’s previous decision
in Hill.194 However, the Court in Hill did not address the question presented in
NAHB, and thus, the NAHB decision did not overrule the Hill decision.195 The
construction project at issue in Hill, while expensive, involved a discretionary
action.196 The Hill Court determined Congress did not mandate the construction
of the dam, and no statute required TVA to put the dam into operation.197 Thus,
the dam’s construction constituted a discretionary action, to which ESA section
7(a)(2) properly applied.198 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s decision in NAHB
did not upset the Court’s previous holding in Hill because NAHB involved a
nondiscretionary agency action, whereas Hill involved a discretionary action.199
Since ESA section 7(a)(2) does not apply to nondiscretionary agency actions,
the Supreme Court in NAHB correctly held ESA section 7(a)(2) does not apply to
CWA section 402(b), a nondiscretionary statute.200 CWA section 402(b) imposes
a nondiscretionary statutory mandate upon the EPA to transfer permitting
authority to state ofﬁcials once the state satisﬁed the nine speciﬁed criteria.201 As
the mandatory nature of CWA section 402(b) illustrates, not all agency actions
involve the agency’s exercise of discretion.202 CWA section 402(b) explicitly
states the EPA “shall approve each submitted program unless [it] determines
that adequate authority does not exist” to meet the nine statutory criteria.203 The

193
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2535-36; 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (stating ESA section
7 applies to discretionary federal actions).
194

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

195

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978) (viewing the dam’s construction
and operation as discretionary because Congress did not mandate the TVA put the dam into
operation, and because Congress did not obligate TVA to spend the funds Congress appropriated
to complete the dam).
196

Id.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

See id. (characterizing the dam’s construction as discretionary because Congress did not
mandate that the TVA put the dam into operation); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2537
(stating the decision to transfer NPDES permitting authority involves a nondiscretionary action).
200
See Gaffney, supra note 185, at 502 (stating the nine statutory requirements in CWA section
402(b) “appear mandatory and exclusive, suggesting that no other federal statute may be considered
in its application”).
201
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (requiring the EPA to approve a State’s transfer request upon a
showing that the State satisﬁed the nine statutory criteria).
202

Id.

203

Id. (emphasis added).
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mandatory nature of the word “shall” in the statute does not provide the EPA with
discretion to consider outside factors when determining whether to grant a state’s
transfer request.204 While the statute does allow the EPA to exercise some discretion
in determining whether a state has satisﬁed the nine criteria, this discretion ends
once the EPA determines the state has satisﬁed those nine requirements.205 As a
result, the Supreme Court correctly held ESA section 7(a)(2) does not apply to
CWA section 402(b)’s statutory mandate.206
In conclusion, ESA section 7(a)(2) does not apply to CWA section 402(b)
because of the nondiscretionary nature of the CWA.207 The CWA’s nondiscretionary
statutory mandate does not permit agencies to look outside the nine statutory
criteria when deciding whether to grant a state’s transfer request.208 Further, ESA
section 7(a)(1)’a requirement that agencies must “utilize their authorities” to
“insure” their actions will not jeopardize listed species does not confer additional
power upon agencies to look beyond the existing law of the CWA.209 Thus,
ESA section 7(a)(2)’s requirement that agencies must “insure” their actions will
not jeopardize listed species does not extend to agencies lacking the discretion
to consider potential negative impacts to listed species.210 This determination
resolves the statutory overlap between the ESA and the CWA by giving effect to
the ESA only when an agency has discretion to consider listed species.211

204
See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1062-63 (reasoning the ESA has no authority to confer upon
agencies the authority to create additional discretion to consider listed species if the agency did not
already possess sufﬁcient discretion to consider listed species).
205
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2007)
(stating that while CWA section 402(b) allows the EPA to exercise some judgment in deciding
whether to grant a State’s transfer request, the “statute clearly does not grant it the discretion to
add another entirely separate prerequisite to that list); Gaffney, supra note 185, at 502 (stating the
EPA’s only source of discretion involves determining whether a state has fully satisﬁed the nine
enumerated criteria set forth in CWA section 402(b)).
206

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538.

207

Id.

208

Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).

209

See Gaffney, supra note 185, at 495 (stating “the ESA directs agencies to ‘utilize their
authorities’ to carry out the ESA’s objectives; it does not expand the powers conferred on an agency
by its enabling act” (internal quotations omitted)).
210
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (stating non-discretionary statutory
mandates, such as the CWA, do not trigger ESA section 7(a)(2)’s consultation and no-jeopardy
requirements).
211
Id. at 2533-34 (interpreting the ESA to apply only to discretionary agency actions which
result in a harmonization of the ESA and the CWA “by giving effect to the ESA’s no-jeopardy
mandate whenever an agency has discretion to do so, but not when the agency is forbidden from
considering such extrastatutory factors”).
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Resolution of the Circuit Split of Authority
In addition to resolving the statutory overlap between the ESA and the
CWA, the Supreme Court’s decision in NAHB also indirectly resolved the split of
authority among the circuits and clariﬁed the particular law courts should follow
when determining the ESA’s scope.212 Prior to NAHB, two competing bodies of
law existed among the circuits.213 The D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit held
that ESA section 7 does not confer additional power on agencies to consider
effects on endangered and threatened species.214 Conversely, the First Circuit and
the Eighth Circuit both held section 7 grants additional power on the agencies
to consider the effect their actions would have on listed species.215 The cases
decided by the First Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, however, involved statutes
which either indicated the agency had some authority to consider species, or
provided sufﬁcient discretion for the agency to consider extra-statutory factors.216
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit cases both addressed the ESA’s
application to statutes that provided limited, if any, discretion to consider factors
not speciﬁcally enumerated in the statute.217
CWA section 402(b) is similar to the statutes addressed by the D.C. Circuit
and Fifth Circuit cases.218 Nothing in the text of section 402(b) confers authority
212
See Jan Hasselman, National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Supreme Court’s Endangered Species Act Decision Should Have Limited Impacts, 22 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 343, 354-56 (2007) (reasoning the NAHB decision solidiﬁed the view that ESA section
7(a)(2) applies only to discretionary agency actions and gave important guidance about how much
discretion is enough to trigger ESA section 7 consultation).
213

Bosse, supra note 30, at 1047-54.

214

Id. at 1050-54.

215

Id. at 1048-50.

216

Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989) (interpreting FIFRA);
Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 714 (1st Cir. 1979)
(interpreting the OCSLA); Bosse, supra note 30, at 1048-50. The OCSLA requires the approval
of an oil exploration plan unless approval would “probably cause serious harm or danger to life.”
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). FIFRA authorizes the
EPA to approve a pesticide registration only after determining that when used in compliance
with a “commonly recognized practice,” the pesticide “will perform its intended function without
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (2000).
217
Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F. 3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting section
402(b) of the CWA); Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962
F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding the EPA did not provide sufﬁcient discretion for FERC to
consider listed species in the issuance of an annual license when the original license did not grant
FERC the ability to amend the license); Bosse, supra note 30, at 1054. The FPA requires FERC to
issue annual licenses “under the terms and conditions of the existing license.” Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (2000).
218

See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). The FPA, the statute in question
in FERC, does not authorize FERC to consider factors outside those speciﬁcally stated in an original
license. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1);. Thus, if an original license does not include a species consideration
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on the EPA to consider impacts to listed species when deciding whether to grant a
state’s transfer request.219 Nor does the statute provide the EPA with discretion to
consider factors not speciﬁcally enumerated in the statute itself.220 Thus, although
ESA section 7(a)(2) mandates all agencies “insure” that their actions will not
jeopardize listed species, this mandate only applies if an action provides the agency
with sufﬁcient discretion to take species into account.221 The Supreme Court in
NAHB correctly applied this rule and properly held ESA section 7(a)(2) does not
apply to the nondiscretionary statutory mandate in CWA section 402(b).222 By
holding section 7(a)(2) of the ESA inapplicable to statutes that provide agencies
with neither statutory authority, nor discretion to consider listed species, the
Supreme Court resolved the split of authority and clariﬁed the law regarding
whether the ESA applies to a particular statute.223

ESA Effectiveness Remains Intact After NAHB
While the NAHB decision provided agencies with guidance on the
applicability of ESA section 7(a)(2) to federal agency actions, the Supreme Court’s
decision worried environmentalists.224 In particular, environmentalists argue the
Court’s decision creates a loophole in the effectiveness of the ESA, and allows
federal agencies to circumvent ESA section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy requirement.225
However, environmentalists need not worry that the NAHB decision will hinder
the protection of listed species in the future because the opinion exempts only
those truly nondiscretionary actions from the ESA’s reach.226 Additionally, the

provision, FERC does not have authority to take listed species into account when deciding whether
to renew the license. Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust, 962 F.2d at 34.
Since neither the FPA nor the CWA authorize an agency to consider factors outside the statute,
the two statutes are similar. See Bosse, supra note 30, at 1054 (reasoning the CWA, like the FPA,
involves a statutory mandate and does not include a provision, however slight, requiring agencies to
consider impacts to species).
219
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). The statute does not include an express provision allowing for species
consideration, and the mandatory nature of the statute does not provide the EPA with discretion to
consider impacts to species once the nine criteria have been met. Id.
220

Id.

221

Bosse, supra note 30, at 1054.

222

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2007).

223

See Hasselman, supra note 212, at 354-56 (stating the NAHB decision provides agencies
with important guidance regarding the application of ESA section 7 to other statutes and duties).
224

Id.; Allison Winter, Enviros fear Supreme Court Ruling Creates ESA ‘Loopholes’, E&N NEWS
PM, June 25, 2007, available at LEXIS.
225

See Winter, supra note 224 (stating the Court’s ruling could open the door for agencies to
ignore listed species when implementing other laws).
226
See Hasselman, supra note 212, at 354 (stating the NAHB opinion is written in a way that
strongly suggests a narrow application).
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decision provides agencies with important guidance regarding the amount of
discretion necessary to trigger ESA section 7 requirements.227
First and foremost, the NAHB decision reafﬁrmed the position the ESA
exempts only truly nondiscretionary agency actions.228 This exemption exists only
when an agency cannot possibly comply with the ESA and some other statute or
duty.229 If a given statute detailing an agency’s obligation to undertake a particular
action also provides some ﬂexibility for the agency to consider listed species, the
agency likely possesses sufﬁcient discretion to take species considerations into
account.230 Thus, such an action would be discretionary and subject to ESA
section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy provision.231
In addition, the NAHB decision does little to undermine the ESA’s effectiveness
because the decision provides agencies with important guidance regarding the
amount of discretion necessary to trigger ESA section 7.232 The opinion suggests
that in the presence of an unambiguous statutory mandate from Congress,
where compliance with the ESA would result in a violation of the statute, an
agency likely lacks sufﬁcient discretion to consider potential impacts to species.233
Conversely, absent such an unambiguous statutory mandate, an agency likely
possesses sufﬁcient discretion to take species considerations into account.234 As a
result, the NAHB Court’s decision should not limit the ESA’s application in the
future, because the decision merely reafﬁrmed the position that ESA section 7
exempts nondiscretionary agency actions.235

227
Id. at 356 (stating the Court provided important guidance about the level of discretion
necessary to trigger ESA section 7).
228
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2007). Prior
to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Defenders of Wildlife, the courts generally agreed that ESA section
7 exempted nondiscretionary agency actions. Hasselman, supra note 212, at 354. Thus, the NAHB
decision merely restored the status quo and reafﬁrmed the general consensus that existed among the
courts prior to Defenders of Wildlife. Hasselman, supra note 212, at 358.
229
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (exempting nondiscretionary agency
actions from the ESA’s reach).
230

Hasselman, supra note 212, at 358 (stating if any ﬂexibility exists regarding how to carry out
the action so that species may also be protected, the exemption does not apply).
231

Id.

232

Id. at 356 (stating the Court provided important guidance on the amount of discretion
necessary to trigger ESA section 7).
233
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (characterizing the Hill Court’s
decision, where Congress did not mandate nor require completion of a federally funded dam
as discretionary, while classifying the NAHB Court’s decision, where the CWA unambiguously
mandates a transfer of NPDES permitting authority once a state has satisﬁed the nine statutory
criteria, as nondiscretionary).
234

Id.

235

Hasselman, supra note 212, at 357.
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CONCLUSION
When the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in NAHB, it struck a balance between section 7(a)(2) of the ESA and CWA
section 402(b).236 The NAHB Court restricted the scope of ESA section 7(a)(2) by
holding section 7(a)(2) no longer applies to “all” federal agency actions “without
exception.”237 The Court clariﬁed the previous confusion regarding which agency
actions are subject to the provisions of the ESA by stating that section 7 applies to
all federal agency actions in which there is discretionary involvement or control.238
The Court’s decision represents a positive step forward toward encouraging
federal agency actions while continuing to place importance on the conservation
of endangered and threatened species and their habitats.239

236

See supra notes 159-235 and accompanying text.

237

See supra notes 164-211 and accompanying text; Tenn. Valley Auth. V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
173 (1978) (stating the language of the ESA “admits of no exception”).
238

See supra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.

239

See supra notes 159-235 and accompanying text.
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